The View from Syria

The “Reelection” of President Bashar al-Asad

Sat, 26 May 2007 08:27:54 -0400

By David Bender
The reelection of Bashar al-Asad will take place tomorrow May 27th. Syrians are presented with the choices of “Yes” or “No.” Voting “No” is not advised and although a few no doubt will, there are real risks. While it is unlikely—though not impossible—that someone would be arrested on the spot for voting “no,” most Syrians see little point in putting themselves in jeopardy when the results are already certain. The only way to show one’s disillusion is to abstain from voting. Some have proposed Syrians all get the flu tomorrow, but this is unlikely to happen. All government employees will be forced to vote, as will members of the military. In Syria, with it massive public sector and universal male conscription, this is perhaps more than half the eligible population. Also, many are nervous about not voting. While not voting in the Parliamentary elections a few weeks ago was not a big deal, failing to vote for the president could potentially be used against you in the future. Thus, in all likelihood, turnout will be respectable and Bashar will be reelected with 97%-99% of the vote.
Adding to this farce is the scene around Syria. Damascus is covered in banners proclaiming the people’s love for the president (see pictures at the bottom of this page). A huge rally was held two days ago in support of another seven-year term for the president. But the propaganda goes way too far. Judging from the signs one would think that Bashar was truly one of the greatest humans to walk the Earth. He is wise, infallible, pious, and universally adored. It is understandable to passionately support a political leader, but to turn him into a virtual demi-god undermines any degree of credibility and turns the whole thing into a somewhat embarrassing exercise.
Critics rightly lament the lack of accountability in Arab politics, but there is a flip side to this problem. The regime is kept so far away from popular discussion that people do not even talk about the good things that it has done. Bashar has a highly mixed record, which is to say that he has made some terrible mistakes and has shown a lack of vision in many areas; but at the same time, he has managed regional crisis more than adequately and made some limited reforms that can be built upon.
It must be remembered that being president of Syria between 2000 and 2007 has not been an easy job. Bashar came to power in the summer of 2000, just as the peace process between Israel and Syria was breaking down. George W. Bush, someone far more inclined towards a pro-Israel (rather than pro-peace, as Clinton had been) stance was about to become the American president. A year later 9/11 happened, creating potential crisis in the Middle East. The war in Afghanistan held the possibility of further instability. Finally the American invasion of Iraq created a massive threat to Syrian national security as an increasingly anti-Syrian White House had 130,000 troops just next door. Tough American sanctions were finally imposed on Syria in 2004. The Hariri assassination in Lebanon (which Syria may be guilty of) further heightened anxiety in Syria. And various Islamist groups have staged attacks inside the country (though none were particularly successful or threatening) over the past several years.
This is not to be an apologist for Bashar. Some of the pressures and problems he faces were of his own making, but the point is that criticisms of his first term should be informed by the very real threats he has faced. But still there has been is virtually no discussion of a report card about his first seven years in office. Accountability can be more than just criticisms of problems; it can also be compliments of successes. Thus, the report card on Bashar al-Asad’s first seven years in office:

Economic Reform: C+
In Bashar’s inauguration speech in 2000, he said that he would focus on economic reform during his first term. There have been some important reforms. Private banking is now permitted; foreign investment is coming in from Gulf countries; and Syria’s economy is growing. But Syria’s economy still performs poorly. Part of the problem is endemic corruption and overly restrictive laws. While this is as much a political problem as an economic one, the economy cannot succeed in any real way until corruption and bribes are brought under control. Syrian business people spend too much of their time trying to work out strategies to get around corruption officials and archaic regulations. Until Bashar really makes an effort to transform the laws and attitudes of government bureaucrats in a fundamental way so that the state starts to serve the interests of businesspeople rather than extort from them, little progress will be made. Nonetheless, there is great potential today for economic growth in Syria, if the right choices are made.

Political Reform: D
Political reform has been essentially non-existence. Syria continues to be an autocratic state ruled by a small clique. Dissent is still punished with potentially long prison terms and the country’s human rights record remains abysmal. Torture in prison is standard practice and the secret police are still ubiquitous. Given all this, why a “D” and not an “F”? Perhaps more a result of Bashar’s personality than any real reform, Syrian society is much more open than before. Today Syrians will talk in public—though not publicly—about politics and problems in Syria. It is a small thing, but there is not the climate of fear as there was under Hafiz al-Asad. That is a real move in the right direction.

Foreign Affairs (excluding Lebanon): B
Against all odds, Syria seems to be emerging as a winner. Syria aided the Iraqi insurgency, funds Hezbollah and Hamas, is allied with Iran, sends—at best—mixed signals on peace to Israel, and has opposed the US at every step over the past four years. For years Syria allowed foreign fighters into Iraq and the US even talked about doing raids into Syria to stop them; but today the US is asking Syria for help on Iraq. Syria has emerged from the chaos of the last several years as the one Arab country with the courage to oppose the US. While this is probably a result more of US and Israeli incompetence than Syrian brilliance, in the end it does not really matter. Syria today—with the exception of its huge liability in Lebanon—is in a stronger position regionally than it has been in for years. However, Syria must now take advantage of its position by engaging the US and Israel and it is not clear if it will or if it will simply bask in self-congratulations.

Lebanon: F
Lebanon may emerge as one of Syria’s greatest strategic failures since 1967. Syria may or may not be guilty of the assassination of Hariri, but what is clear is that the government has not had any plan with how to effectively deal with Lebanon. The UN tribunal investigating the killing may yet name top Syrian officials. If Syria is found to have played a role in the assassination, all of Bashar’s other accomplishments will mean nothing and Syria will become a pariah state like Libya post-Lockerbie. While Syria may be hoping for some grand bargain that will excuse its role in Hariri’s death, there is little to suggest that the US or France are interested in letting Syria off the hook. Lebanon is Syria’s greatest liability right now and may prove to be the greatest threat to Bashar’s rule.

Comparing Syria and South Korea

Tue, 24 Apr 2007 08:00:50 -0400

By David Bender
Comparing Syria and South Korea may seem to be odd endeavor, but the two countries have more in common that one might suppose. Both countries have faced many similar challenges in the post-World War II era, but each has responded in dramatically different ways. Today South Korea is one of the riches countries in the world having recently become one of 14 countries with a trillion dollar economy and the highest rate of broadband-wired homes anywhere. Syria’s economy, while continuing to make modest gains, struggles to grow at a rate to keep up with population growth.
In 1965, Syria had a per capita GDP of $272 and South Korea’s was $106 (both in 2004 dollars). Both Syria and South Korea entered in the post-War era as states trying to recover from long colonial periods. In the case of Syria, the result of the French occupation was dysfunctional political institutions and a backward economy (they also had to deal with 400 years of Ottoman rule, which ranged from enlightened to utterly backward). South Korea entered the contemporary era more painfully, with no political institutions and a nearly non-existent economy. Then to make matters worse, the Korean Peninsula became another color on the map that the USSR and US agreed to divide between themselves. Korea would not rejoin the community of independent nations as a united entity. There would be a communist north and a capitalist south (though both would be similarly dictatorial).
The late 1940’s through the 1950’s were not easy times for either Syria or South Korea. Both had to deal with new, dangerous, aggressive, and powerful neighbors. The 1948 War left a powerful impression on Syria as a country. Thoroughly defeat by the newly declared State of Israel, the Syrian government, along with the society as a whole, made a decision that regaining Palestine and destroying the Zionist Entity would be a primary national mission.
From the late 1950’s Syria underwent numerous coups and counter-coups and a failed union with Egypt. Also there was constant Western meddling in Lebanon with the goal of installing a more pro-Western leader in Damascus. After the failed union with Egypt, there was a return to coups, and finally the establishment of some stable political in 1971, when Hafiz al-Asad came to power. The 1967 war further cemented the notion that Syria was under threat from Israel. Israel had proven its military superiority, and unlike in the war in 1948, had even managed to grab a strategically important piece of Syrian territory, the Golan Heights.
For the newly defined entity of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), its first years would similarly traumatic. Aided by the Soviet Union and newly communist China, the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea launched a massive invasion of the south. Little land was lost or gained in the end, but the Korean Peninsula had once again been fully ravaged by war.
As the Korean Peninsula emerged as one of the front lines in the Cold War, US policymakers thought it too risky to either withdraw American troops or to trust the South Korean people to elect government that would strongly support the US position against the USSR. As a result, the US stationed tens of thousands of troops throughout South Korea and supported one brutal military dictator after another.
Thus, by the 1970’s it would seem that Syria and South Korea had more in common than might be expected: superpower meddling, dangerous military threats from neighbors, and autocratic political systems. Syria continued to have a higher per capita GDP, but the difference was small.
However post-war South Korea made practical and effective economic and political decisions. The military dictatorship, while nearly as an oppressive as the one in North Korea, and probably more so than most Syrian governments, decided to sacrifice national sovereignty by accepting the United States military presence in the country. But they then implemented very intelligence economic policies. Starting in the 1960’s, the South Korean government created close ties between the state and business, offering credit, tariff protections, and sponsoring development in certain fields, such as the emerging electronics industry. Rather than looking for raw materials to export and thus becoming dependent on world commodity prices, the government promoted the importation of raw materials and the export of finished goods. Such a policy creates high prices and shortages among consumer goods in the domestic market, but the military police was able to handle, with often with brutal tactics, any civil unrest.
While the science of it is still being worked out—does A lead to B or vice-versa—there clearly is a link between material prosperity and political rights. During the 1980’s, South Korea experienced spectacular economic growth. At the same time, there was serious unrest among students and unions and by 1993, after 32 years of military dictatorship, the South Koreans elected their first civilian president. Within a decade, South Korea had asked most US troops not stationed along the DMZ to leave and the US complied. South Korea had become too important an economic and political ally to risk antagonizing it. Around the same time, South Korean actually broke with the US in dealing with the North and held its own set of talks with their northern neighbor as part of its Sunshine Policy. South Korea today has emerged as an important player in East Asian politics and a major economic actor in the world.
Syria, though, has remained isolated. With a backward economy and dysfunctional political system, Syria’s importance mainly comes from its geo-strategic location. However this need not be the case. Much of Syria’s marginalized status comes from the fact that it has little to offer Israel, the United States, or Europe. When South Korea wants to make a point, the world needs to listen, as it is now probably the third most important country in East Asia. Part of the reason that peace between Israel and Syria is so difficult is that for a treaty to be signed the Israelis are going to have to give up the Golan. Syria has little to offer in return in terms of political support or economic incentives. If Syria had a more dynamic economy and could offer the world investment opportunities and meaningful trade agreements, the lack of respect accorded Syria today would have to change.
Such a reorientation, however, would be more radical than anything that has happened in Syria in decades. Syria reversing course would undermine Baathist ideals, betray the cause of Palestine, and give up its status as the last Arab country with a government not allied (at least tacitly) with the US. For the moment Syria under far too much international pressure and the region is far too unstable to try anything so risky. But South Korea ought to be an example showing that a focus on economic development at the expense of limited notions of national pride can actually increase a state’s national sovereignty in the end.
There are certainly numerous factors that could be cited that show the situational differences between Syria and South Korea. The largely unchallenged American supremacy in the Pacific during the Cold War, the special relationship between Israel and the US (and Europe), the rise of Islamism, and massive oil reserves have all worked to the disadvantage of Middle Eastern countries. Nonetheless, for me, the question remains: What if South Korea had decided in the late 1950’s that it would first work towards reuniting the entire Korea Peninsula and after that was accomplished, it would begin to concentrate on economic development?
Thus the questions is less about specific contexts for development and more about an attitude towards a national mission. Syria is faced with a choice and as a non-Syrian myself I cannot claim to know what is best, however I see little evidence among Syrians that they understand that there is a choice to be made. Neither resistance to the American global system nor acceptance of it is easy or without risk, but until there is a broad understand of the choice between the two within Syria society there is little chance that either effective anti-imperialist resistance or significant economic progress will occur.

Syrian Parliamentary Elections

Thu, 19 Apr 2007 10:28:06 -0400

By David Bender
Parliamentary elections are this Sunday in Syria. Unlike presidential elections in Syria (due in May or June), these elections fully free to the extent that one can vote for whomever one desires, anyone can stand for office, and the candidates with the most votes do win. Damascus (and I presume other Syrian cities, as well) is covered with campaign banners emblazoned with the names of one of the over nine thousand people (including over one thousand women) running for Parliament. Candidates set up huge tents in open areas in the city where each night they serve tea and coffee to potential voters to a backdrop of live music. It would seem that Syria is abuzz with election fever.
However, I have yet to talk to a single Syrian who intends to vote. Few can even name issues that are being discussed, aside from abstract calls for reducing corruption. Candidates’ banners generally say little aside from highly controversial slogans such as: “Children are our future!” So many Syrians have an attitude that the election does not really matter. Unfortunately, they are probably right.
Constitutionally, the Syrian Parliament has virtually no power. It cannot introduce legislation; it only approves laws submitted by the president (which it always does). Part of this comes from the fact that these elections are only for a minority of the seats in the Parliament. Syria is a Baathist state under the Constitution. As such, the Baath party is automatically assigned 50% of the seats plus one seat. Combined with nine other parties that are a part of the ruling coalition and thus guaranteed seats, there are only about 80 seats (out of 250) that are truly contested. Such a situation is never likely to inspire political activism.
But a Syrian friend of mine summarized the more important reason for Syrian lack of interest in the election when I asked him if he planned on voting.
“No, why should I vote? They’re not running for Parliament for me, they’re running for themselves,” he said.
While there are a few candidates who are running with real ideas and a respectable following (Mohammad al-Habash is probably the most widely known and respected), most are running because being a Member of Parliament is a highly profitable vocation. First, being a Member of Parliament opens doors to take part in the corrupt deals that are the foundation of the Syrian economy. Bribes, import monopolies, and business opportunities abound. Second, members of Parliament are granted legal immunity and diplomatic passports. Effectively this becomes a carte blanche to engage in deals that even push the limits of what is acceptable in Syria. Syrians all know this and as such have little interest in taking time out of their day to vote for someone whose main interest in public service is personal enrichment.
Given the lack of political enthusiasm, candidates need other ways to get people to the polls to vote for them (beyond a free cup of coffee and some music). Using family connections and paying for votes two ways. Extended families in Syria are often extremely large. If a candidate can get huge numbers of relatives to vote for him or her, given the small voter turnout, gaining a seat is a real possibility. Presumably those relatives know that they are likely to benefit from having a family member in Parliament, as well. Also effective in getting a good turnout is simply paying people for votes.
One Syrian friend recounted her experience: “A relative called me and said that one of his friends was running for Parliament. He said that I should vote for him. I said, ‘OK” and then he told me that if I voted for his friend that I would benefit.”
She then explained further: “That means that at the polling station, they would give me some money after I voted for him.”
“How much?” I ask incredulously.
“I don’t know, probably about 500 lira ($10).”
Apparently there is no problem with having a campaign worker standing at some poll stations handing 500 lira notes to everyone who votes for a particular candidate. The practice is not rampant, but nor is it unheard of.
While $10 in and of itself is not a huge amount of money, giving that to too many voters would quickly add up. However, winning candidates, in addition to all the rights and privileges granted to them as MP’s, are paid a stipend of three million Syrian pounds (about $60,000) for their campaign expenses.
In the end, though, whether Parliamentary elections in Syria are corrupt or not have few consequences. The executive wholly dominates Syria’s political system and no reform can emerge unless the president proposes it. Political reform seems unlikely in the near future. Riyad Sayf is one of the few Parliamentarians who tried to use his seat to push for reform, however he found himself in and out of prison and in constant legal danger (mostly over supposedly unpaid taxes).
However some useful reform could come out of the upcoming presidential election. While few expect Bashar al-Asad to get much less than 99% of the vote, he will be forced to give a series of speeches in which he will likely outline some ideas for reform. When he was first elected in 2000, he said that he wanted to begin with economic reform. Using China as an example of a country that has focused on economic reform before political reform, he said that change would first come to Syria’s economic policy. Indeed important economic changes have happened, though Intel just opened a research center in China and is unlikely to do so anytime soon in Syria. It will be interesting to see the model that Bashar puts forward this time. China is a tough act to emulate: its size and global importance mean that it is a natural economic power. Syria will never be China, just as Belgium will not ever be. A more useful model for Syria might be other smaller East Asia countries, such as Vietnam today, Malaysia a generation ago, or South Korea two generations ago. Those are places that have put economic growth before political reform and legitimate elections with phenomenal results.

Syrian Tolerance

Fri, 23 Mar 2007 08:36:58 -0400

By David Bender
A notable contrast between Syria and Egypt is the different way foreigners are treated in each place. While both places are generally very welcoming, foreigners in Egypt are greeted with a barrage of “hellos’ and stares on the street. Walking around in Cairo, it seems that nearly every kid feels the need to say “Hi! Welcome in Egypt. Where from?” Occasionally, there is even an adult who will engage in the welcoming. It is all in good spirit—at times it can even be charming—but it also demonstrates a lack of consciousness about the normality of difference. Egypt is a fairly homogenous place. It is 90% Sunni Muslim, Egyptian nationalism emphasizes the exceptionalism of Egypt in the contemporary Arab world and in history. Egypt’s Pharaonic ruins are impressive, but there is perhaps not other country in the world that so closely identifies its contemporary identity with the feats of its ancients. As such, there is strong sense of who is a non-Egyptian in Egypt and as a foreigner one really feels it.
Syrians are admirably comfortable with difference. Syria is a highly diverse place, ethnically, religiously, and socially. First, from a purely visual standpoint, Syrians are quite varied in their looks. Egyptians have a far more distinctive ‘look’ than Syrians. This is the result of history and geography. Over the millennia, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders, Mongols, Turks, and the French have all passed through Syria. Their genetic marks are still visible. The Nile Valley, while hardly isolated, is a more insular place. This has mean that Syrians are intrinsically comfortable with the notion that people look different—even within their own country. There are fair- and dark–skinned Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Turks, Turkmen, and various other smaller groups. As a foreigner in Damascus I am often mistaken as a Syrian, not because I look particularly Arab, but rather because Syrians just assume that their compatriots can look like anything.
Religiously Syria is equally diverse. While there is a small Sunni majority, Syrian society is consciously inclusive of large number of religious minorities, including, Alawis, Christians (Catholic and Orthodox), Druze, Ismailis, and even the few remaining Jews. Acceptance of religious difference is a fairly natural disposition for most Syrians. Perhaps as a result of this religious polyglot, even among Sunnis there is far less social pressure to practice religion than in other Arab countries. There are many pious Syrians, but Damascene society seems to intrinsically accept the Prophet Muhammad’s Hadith that states, “There is no compulsion in religion.” On Thursday night (the night before the Syrian weekend), there are scenes of inebriated Syrians leaving clubs and getting into taxis driven by long bearded religious-looking drivers. Both largely accept the other, even if they do not agree with each other’s lifestyle choices. With exceptions, religion is a more private matter in Syria than in other Arab countries.
This is in contrast to Egypt where the outward display of religious faith is seen everywhere. The most conspicuous sign is the prayer bruise on the upper forehead of many men. This mark has always been something of a mystery to me. It comes from repeatedly touching ones head to the ground during prayer. However, it is extremely rare to see a man in Syria with the mark, despite Syria having plenty of pious Muslim men. Insofar as I can tell, in Egypt, it is purely an announcement of one’s devotion to prayer and thus to God. But it serves as a constant visual reminder that Egypt is a place where Islam plays a much more public role than in Syria.
Likewise, there is tremendous tension between Muslims and Christians in Egypt. The Egyptian government is remarkably effective at keeping stories about religious violence aimed at Coptic Christians out of Western newspapers, but it is a common occurrence. Last fall there were anti-Christian riots in Alexandria after a Christian-produced play supposedly insulted Islam. In Middle Egypt churches are occasionally targets of arson and face constant bureaucratic pressure from the government and denied permissions to make any improvements. The Egyptian government knows that such stories would cause great discomfort in the West and is generally able to keep journalists from areas in which there is tension.
Some Syrians credit Hafez al-Asad and secular Baathism for this spirit of tolerance that exists in Syria. The Baath party has strongly promoted secularism and limited religion’s influence in society to a degree. It is easy to see Hafez al-Asad as nothing more than a brutal dictator—and he was that—but at the same time it is important to recognize what he did for the country. Lebanon and Iraq are both equally diverse and both are being torn apart by sectarianism. Syrians may not be thrilled with their current government but there is a genuine fear that if it is overthrown, Syria could descend into Iraqi-style sectarian violence.
This is not to say that there is no tension between the different groups in Syria. When I told a Syrian friend (who is a member of one of the minority groups) recently how impressed I was by the general level of tolerance among different groups in Syria, he responded by saying that below the surface there were strains. This is true, but the key is that they are not overt. There is little below the surface in Iraq or Lebanon. If Syria were as unstable as Iraq or Lebanon, Syrians would no doubt seek out fellow members of their groups for aid and protection, but as long as Syria remains secure there is no reason to believe that the current situation will change.
However, even if the Syrian government were to fall (there are no signs such is imminent), I question how easily Syrians would succumb to begin—as they say in Lebanon where one’s sect is printed on the national identity cards—‘killing according to the ID.’ It could happen and there are certainly scores to be settled, but the government cannot be the only reason that Syria has resisted the sectarian tensions that consume its neighbors. Prior to the rule of Hafez al-Asad there were only limited examples of sectarian strife, there has not been a major outbreak of sectarian violence since 1860, when Christians were targeted by Muslim mobs in Damascus for their supposed collaboration with the French.
Similar to race in Brazil or class in the United States, Syrians see their culture as different from other places when it comes to sectarianism. Brazilians see race relations in their country as different from the racism of the United States; Americans see class in the US as being different from historical class conflict Europe; and Syrians see their approach to sectarianism as being different from that in Iraq and Lebanon. Importantly, it is something that is a source of great pride for many Syrians. Sectarian killing is something for Iraqis and Lebanese, not Syrians, they proclaim. All national myths have some idealization and some truth in them and Syria’s lack of sectarianism is no different. But in the Middle East today, living peacefully with some self-deception is quite a bit better than the alternative.

Egyptian and Syrian Paths

Tue, 20 Mar 2007 07:03:48 -0400

By David Bender
Last week I was in Cairo for several days to visit some friends. Cairo is a city of extremes. Compared with Damascus, it is richer and poorer, more worldly and more provincial. Stylish malls and restaurants in Cairo are of a quality that simply does not exist in Damascus; but the poverty in the slums and shantytowns of Cairo is also rarely found in Syria. The high end in Egypt is much higher than in Syria, but so too is the low end much lower.
Egypt is a place that is connected to the world. While the Internet is still slow and sometimes censored in Syria, the Egyptian government provides unfettered free dialup service to everyone in Egypt. In my friend’s apartment (in an admittedly wealthy area of Cairo), there were some six wireless signals I could pick up. The newspapers are filled with offers for home DSL installation; in Syria prices are high and availability is low for broadband. Egypt Air flies to far more destinations with far greater frequency than Syrian Arab Airlines. Unlike in Syria, Egyptian businesses have access to global capital markets and Egypt’s stock market, while tiny for a country of 80 million, is well established.
However, Egypt has a level of poverty that simply does not exist in Syria. While the gap between rich and poor in Syria has grown somewhat in recent years, it is still a far more egalitarian place than Egypt. Even the poorest neighborhoods in Damascus have paved roads, utilities, and fairly clean streets; but in Cairo even near the center city or touristy markets in Khan al-Khalili, streets are in disrepair with piles of rubbish and crumbling buildings everywhere. Farther out of the city, rural migrants live in shantytowns with sand streets. While there are some Syrian towns out in the desert areas towards Iraq that are mired in poverty, in the cities of Syria there is little of the crushing poverty that exists throughout Egypt.
Similarly extreme, the Syrian educational system, while hardly known for its excellence, is competent. More importantly, education in Syria for decades has now been available to the whole population. In Egypt, wealthy private schools and the American University in Cairo are as fine as any in the world. But Egypt’s basic level of education is lacking. Fewer than half of Egyptian women can read (and only slightly more than 68% of men can). In Syria the literacy rate for men is nearly 90% and for women it is 64%.
This assessment bodes very well for Syria. Syria has been isolated for much of its recent history; yet it still compares well with Egypt, which has enjoyed excellent relations with the West for nearly three decades. When Syria decides to reorient itself (and when the US allows it to do so with a degree of dignity), Syria will be poised to, as one Syrian recently told me, “become a Middle Eastern Taiwan.”
While such is perhaps overly optimistic, Syria does a have a remarkable opportunity that Egypt largely missed. Despite decades of poor economy policy, dreadful diplomatic relations with most of the world, only limited economic agreements with the European Union (and currently under US sanctions), nearly no foreign aid (a result of being on the State Department’s list of countries that sponsor terrorism), and a stifling political system at home, Syria is not a country sliding into greater poverty. The economy is growing—if too slowly to keep up with population growth—and living standards have risen noticeably since Bashar came to power in 2000. New restaurants and stores are opening all the time in Damascus and there has been a noticeable rise in the number of private businesses.
Not insignificantly, while Syria attracts a fair number of tourists from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, there are very few tourists from the West. Paradoxically this could be an advantage. Much of the Egyptian economy is dependent on Western tourism and as such, events outside of the control of the Egyptian government can devastate its second largest earner of foreign currency. Wars, violence, and terrorist attacks in Egypt or the region mean that the country cannot depend on tourism for a steady source of income. Yet so much of the Egyptian economy is oriented toward tourism that dips in tourist numbers really hit the overall health of the economy. Syria, by contrast, has nearly as impressive—if far less famous—tourist attractions (see my pictures of Syria here) but very little tourist infrastructure and a relatively small number of people who earn their livelihood from foreign tourists. Syria has a chance to build an economy based on the production of goods and to only use tourism as a source of foreign cash, rather than as the backbone of the entire economy. Tourism earns Egypt a lot of money, but it also creates an economy in which growth is dependent on vacation choices made in living rooms in Europe and North America, not in Egyptian boardrooms.
Thus, despite all of Egypt’s trade agreements, foreign aid, tourist dollars, and political support from the West, the average Syrian and Egyptian does not have a significantly different standard of living. Whether this a credit to Syria or a criticism of Egypt is unclear, but the point is that when Syria makes a move to come in from the cold (something I believe is inevitable) it could potentially be in an excellent position to start becoming a far more successful country.

Banning Skype

Tue, 6 Mar 2007 06:49:50 -0500

By David Bender
International telephone rates from Syria are very expensive. Usually they range from $1 to $2 a minute to non-Arab countries (calling to Arab countries is more reasonable). In recent months, Syrians have discovered Skype and voice chat over MSN, Yahoo, and Google Talk and Internet cafes are filled with Syrians (and foreigners) chatting away with friends and family in other countries.
The effect of this is that the state-owned telephone company has been losing huge sums of money on its international services since few people still use the regular phone for international calls. This is not a problem unique to the Syrian telephone company, of course. Phone companies in the West have been struggling with how to deal with Internet telephony. Many are moving to provide Internet services themselves and pushing their own internet-based calling services. Essentially, they are doing what business must do when an economic paradigm shifts by adapting.
State-owned Syrian companies, though, are not particularly nimble. Thus, last week, the government outlawed making telephone calls over the Internet from Internet cafes. The police are checking in Internet cafes and if they see someone talking, they will close the Internet cafe and the owners will have to pay huge fines and bribes to reopen. The odd thing is that people themselves who are talking are not punished or fined; it's just the Internet cafe.
More oddly, if one has Internet service at home, one is allowed to talk (or at least the police cannot enforce the ban). The government could have blocked all the sites that allow Internet telephony, but they did not do that. I talked with a Syrian about why this was the case. He said that outside of Damascus and perhaps Aleppo, the ban would not be enforced. This illustrates the peculiar sociological make-up of the Syrian government.
A small religious sect called the Alawis runs Syria. The Alawi are a small offshoot of Shia Islam. Under the Ottomans they were considered a heretical sect, and thus faced horrible persecution, living in impoverished rural villages essentially as sharecroppers. However, under the French Mandate, the Alawi made a push to join the army and after independence, their condition was beginning to improve. When Hafiz al-Asad, an Alawi, came to power in 1971, the previously marginalized group was suddenly the elite.
Hafiz al-Asad filled the top police, security, and military positions with Alawis. Huge numbers of Alawis moved from their remote rural mountain villages to Damascus in the 1980’s. This was partly an effort by the government to create a critical mass of Alawis in the capital to guard against a Sunni coup, but it was also a natural consequence of many Alawis getting jobs in the capital.
Natives of Damascus, though, resented the influx of comparatively unrefined, uneducated country bumpkins into their relatively sophisticated city. With so many rural Alawis in Damascus, the enforcement of the law in the city was often cruder than in other, less important cities. In Homs (the third largest city in Syria), for example, local elites continued to rule the city and enforce the laws (under the watchful eye of the central government, of course). Only in Damascus, and to an extent in Aleppo, did rural people rule urban people.
Thus, in regard to the banning of Internet telephony, a Syrian told me, “The police in Damascus [who presumably are originally from the villages in the coastal mountains] don’t even understand the Internet or telephone calls over it. They say close it and they do without understanding what it is.”
This is not to say that all Alawis are somehow backward peasants. Indeed there are many who are as sophisticated and learned as anyone. In general, Alawis lead more secular-style lives and are less traditional than other Syrians. Some have been able to take advantage of their group’s privileged position, but others have gotten ahead on the merits of their own abilities. Nonetheless, for many Sunnis in Damascus, the perceptions—even if they themselves would allow that there are many exceptions—is that Alawis who come from the countryside to Damascus are less sophisticated than the city’s natives.
But back to the case of banning Skype, cheap international telephone calls are a way for Syrian to become more connected to the world. Syria is an isolated place both politically and economically. But being able to chat with people around the world has the potential to create international connections that could bring economic and social benefits in the future.
It is doubtful that this law will last for very long—even by Syrian standards it is too absurd—but it is a distressing sign that when faced with uncertainty about how a new technology will influence the economy (or society, though I doubt this law has anything to do stopping Syrians from talking to outsiders), the first instinct of the government is to ban it.

Update (March 20): As predicted, the ban on Internet telephony seems not to be enforced anymore. People are again chatting away on Skype in Internet cafes.

The Crisis of Syrian Nationalisms

Mon, 26 Feb 2007 09:43:14 -0500

By David Bender
Syria is a highly nationalistic country; but its nationalism is split between a strong sense of Syrian identity and pan-Arabism. While the ideals of pan-Arabism are still occasionally given lip service around the Arab world, it is only in Syria that the concept is still taken seriously on political and social levels.
However, the nearly one million Iraqi refugees in Syria are challenging the country’s commitment to pan-Arabism. Iraqis, as fellow Arabs, were initially welcomed by Syrians with open arms and treated as victims of US aggression. However, as their numbers grew and they began to place heavy strains on the economy and society, some Syrians have begun to question the wisdom of sacrificing more for fellow Arabs at the expense of their own prosperity and stability. For over 50 years, official Syrian policy has been that it is necessary to sacrifice political rights and economic prosperity for the cause of Palestine. Syrians have largely accepted this bargain, but the strains placed on Syria from the Iraqis may be causing Syrians to question the wisdom of an existence based on sacrifice for fellow Arabs.
A discernible shift in the Syria government’s policy has yet to occur. A couple of weeks ago, the US State Department authorized the American Embassy in Damascus to speak to the Syrian government about the Iraqi refugee crisis. Prior to that directive, the embassy has been largely prohibited to talking to the Syrian government. In a move that was either principled or stubborn, the Syrian government replied that it would only speak with the US if it were willing to discuss all regional issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Obviously, the US is unwilling to enter into such a dialogue. Thus, Syria is left to deal with the Iraqi refugees alone. Arabism won out over Syrian self-interest.
The irony of this, however, is that Syria is becoming increasingly isolated within the Arab world. The country has long been shunned in Western circles, but in recent years it has faced unprecedented hostility from fellow Arab states. This shift has two causes: first, Syria has been blamed for the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who had very close ties to the Saudi government. Second, Syria has a deepening alliance with non-Arab, Shia Iran. Sunni Arab states are beginning to voice alarm at Iran’s growing power in the region. Syria and Hezbollah are increasingly seen in Riyadh, Amman, and capitals throughout the Persian Gulf as Iranian agents in the Arab world. Whispers of a Saudi plot to try to ferment regime change in Damascus are appearing the international press with greater frequency.
The consequences of all of this are that Syria is being marginalized among within the Arab world. A couple of weeks ago there were discussions about how to resolve the Lebanese political crisis. Attending the talks were representatives from the Lebanese government, Hezbollah, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Syria, the preeminent power in Lebanon for two decades, was excluded. Recent talks between Hamas and Fatah in Mecca again excluded Syria, despite Hamas having its headquarters in Damascus. Increasingly, it seems Arab countries either do not care what Syria has to say or they consciously want to marginalize it. This is very much in line with American wishes to isolate Syria, but it is not clear that the Arab treatment of Syria is a result of US pressure; rather, it seems that most governments in the region want to isolate Syria for their own reasons.
Thus with internal pressure from Iraqi refugees, powerlessness to help to Palestinians in their struggle, and an Arab world that is quickly disengaging it, Syrian pan-Arabism is heading for crisis. In the end, though, this could benefit Syria. Pan-Arabism has been a noble idea since its inception a century ago, but for a variety of reasons it has been unable to deliver on its promises. Egypt, the spiritual center of pan-Arabism under Gamal abd al-Naser in the 1960’s, abandoned the ideology a long time ago. Syria will soon have no choice but to do the same.
On balance, nationalism can be a highly destructive force. Most countries that either implode or lash out at their neighbors do it under the banner of nationalism. But in the case of Syria, it is possible that greater Syrian—rather than Arab—nationalism could affect positive change. Syria is not some third world basket case of a country that would have to use nationalism to distract its people from their daily suffering. It has fairly good infrastructure, including good roads, a decent rail network, a solid healthcare system, and an effective vocational education system. Syria has the potential to be a highly successful country.
The country has been unable to take advantage of these things because of external policy choices. But current realities could force change. Convincing Syrians to sacrifice for Palestine was easy because Palestine was an abstract, but emotionally powerful cause. Today’s challenges are more mundane, but they affect people’s everyday lives more. Wealthy Iraqis have been buying up houses in Damascus forcing prices up some 300%; food prices have gone up as well. Schools are overcrowded with Iraqi children. Crime is rising with vast numbers of unemployed Iraqis in financial distress. Areas of Damascus are suffering from massive overcrowding (the million refugees in Syria constitute a 5% rise in population in just two years). It is not clear if the country’s infrastructure can handle this massive population growth.
Syria’s southern neighbor Jordan is an example of a country that is trying to use nationalism to its advantage. Throughout Jordan there are signs that state: “الاردن اولاﹰ,” or “Jordan First.” While this slogan is clearly aimed at promoting unity between native Jordanians and the majority Palestinian population, it is an example of a Middle Eastern country looking inward rather than projecting its frustrations outward toward Tel Aviv or all the way to Washington. A “Syria First” campaign would be a radical readjustment in Syria policy, a reversal of nearly 50 years of official policy and a challenge to ordinary Syrians to change the way they see their identity. But it could be beneficial.
I was talking to a Syrian friend a few weeks ago about this notion that Syria had based so much of its identity on sacrifice for Palestine but in the end had gained neither Palestine nor domestic prosperity.
“My cousin was killed by an Israeli missile when he was stationed in Lebanon [before the Syrian withdrawal]. His body was so badly burned we couldn’t even bury him,” he told me. “I’m tired of sacrificing for Palestine. We should sacrifice for Syria.”

Hezbollah and the Political Crisis in Lebanon

Mon, 29 Jan 2007 11:17:13 -0500

By David Bender
The political crisis that has consumed Lebanon for months and the street violence last week is not simply about Iran and Syria using Hezbollah to maintain their influence in Lebanese affairs. There certainly is that element, but the conflict is also about internal Lebanese sectarian struggles dating back to the 1930’s.
Since the French formation of Lebanon in the 1920’s, politics in the tiny country have been based on sectarianism. Constitutionally the president must be a Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia. While this gives the impression of an equitable division of power, in truth Lebanon has been run by a small number of Christians and Sunnis, who—despite their internal differences—have ensured that the Shias remain on the margins. For most of modern Lebanese history, there was little the Shia minority could do about this arrangement. The emergence of Hezbollah in the 1980’s gave the Shias of Lebanon a voice in their country’s affairs for the first time.
Hezbollah was formed with the goal of expelling the Israelis from Lebanese territory, but over the past 20 years they also became an important social and political organization that brought schools, hospitals, and political influence to Shia areas that had never had any of those things. While often labeled merely a terrorist organization in the West, the more complicated truth is that Hezbollah is a multifaceted organization. For every rocket lobed into northern Israel there is a Shia family that depends on Hezbollah’s welfare programs to survive.
UN resolution 1551, which called for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon (which occurred in the spring of 2005) and the disarming of all Lebanese militias (which was aimed at Hezbollah), did not take into account the internal sectarian and class divisions in Lebanon. Many have hoped that Hezbollah would give up its arms and focus on its social welfare activities and try to forward its agenda through the political process. Clearly that did not happen and the war with Israel last summer demonstrated that Hezbollah is still a formidable fight force.
While their reasons for refusing to disarm are multiple, among the most important is that Hezbollah fears without the influence that comes with being the most capable fighting force in the country, the Christians and Sunni would gang up against the Shia and push them back into the fringes where they have been for centuries.
Indeed this is roughly what is happening right now. Sunnis and most Christians support the embattled coalition government; Hezbollah and its one Christian ally (Michel Aoun, whose intentions in allying with Hezbollah are unclear) have pulled out of the government and are calling for new elections or at least a new cabinet that would give them the power to veto any decision (which requires one-third of the seats). The Shias have never had such power and have never even been in a position to demand such influence, but with Hezbollah’s victory over Israel in the summer and its position as the strongest militia in Lebanon, Hasan Nasrallah (the leader of Hezbollah) seems to be betting that this is the moment for the long suffering Shias of Lebanon to make their move.
Last week Nasrallah called for a general strike to show the potential might of the Shias. For a day all of Lebanon was nearly shutdown. Blocking roads and shutting stores (sometimes by force), the entire country came to a standstill. It was a show of force that the government could continue to ignore the Shia at its own peril. A couple of days later, violence broke out at Beirut Arab University between rival groups. Over the next several days around 5 people were killed. It is a small number by Lebanese sectarian fighting standards, but an ominous sign of the potential of future violence. Following these days of chaos, Nasrallah went on TV and called for his followers to stop their protests and to halt all violence. When Lebanese kill Lebanese, he said, then they are no better than the Israelis. Nasrallah seemingly has near total authority over his Shia followers and since the speech Lebanon has been peaceful, if somewhat tense.
This attempt to carve out a greater political role for the Shia creates—or should create—a dilemma for the West. Shunning its weapons, Hezbollah is using (mostly) peaceful protests to affect political change in the country. If it gains the veto power, it is unclear how it would use it or what its goals are. Sunnis, Christians, and the West obviously fear it would lead to greater Iranian and Syrian influence in the country. They may be right, but Hezbollah serves two masters: the Iranians and Syria are it benefactors, but recent events are showing that its greatest influence comes from its loyal constituents.
The Lebanese political system is based on the lie that the country is 50 percent Christian and 50 percent Muslim. Everyone knows it is a lie, but most have agreed not to challenge it to avoid a return to civil war. The truth, however, is that Christians are now probably less than 30 percent of the population, Sunnis are slightly more, and the Shia may soon constitute an outright majority. Hezbollah, in addition to all the bad stuff it does (which is well documented by newspapers around the world), may simply be fighting for more a democratic Lebanon—if more for self-serving reasons than righteous ones. The problem is that the Christians of Lebanon will never accept an official recognition that they are no longer a majority and the Sunni would be very nervous about giving the Shia so much power.
For many decades now, Lebanon has served as something of a proxy for the wars of the region. The Israelis fought the Palestinians and Syrians in Lebanon; the Iranians gained a foothold in the Arab world in Lebanon; and the US and French have exercised their influence in the region through Lebanon. This is happening again right now and there are reports that the Iranians, Saudis (who strongly back the government), the Lebanese government, and Hezbollah are in secret talks about resolving the crisis. Hopefully they will be able reach a compromise before it is too late. But the current impasse is not only a regional issue; it is also something that goes right to the heart of why Lebanon is such a politically dysfunctional country. Part of Hezbollah’s fight is about Israel, Syria, or Iran; but it is also about its Shia constituents living in poverty in the south and in the slums of Beirut. At some point the there will have to some real talks about how to come to terms with the Shias’ newfound political voice.